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No. 2132/PR  
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Top Secret  
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To London  
Comrade YERMAKOV [A. V. Guk]

Ref no. 1673/PR of 24.10.83.

In response to your request we are sending you the information which the Centre has regarding possible operations by the USA and its allies on British territory in preparation for RYAN.

Attachment: Brief No. 2133/PR of 7 pages, Top Secret, PN.

SILIN  
[G. F. TITOV]  
[Head of FCD Third Department]

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BRIEF  
[Extract]

*1. The Nature of Possible Contacts and Consultations Between the United States Government and the British Leadership before RYAN*

If the US government were to hold consultations with its allies before RYAN, then the leaders of Great Britain, as one of the USA's close allies would take part. These consultations might take place both on a bilateral, and as is fully possible, on a multilateral basis (e.g. in NATO).

In our view, persons holding key positions in the country's leadership must necessarily be involved in preparing and establishing contacts with the US government on the eve of RYAN.

Consequently, a constant watch should be kept on the movements of their people, their residences, and their contacts in order to discover any possible contacts and consultations between the US government and the British leadership before RYAN.

*2. Possible Changes in the System of Operation of Central Departments and Institutions in Great Britain in the Period Starting from Preparation of the Preliminary Decision for RYAN to the Launching of a Nuclear Strike.*

Surprise is the key element in the main adversary's plans and preparations for war in today's conditions. As a result it can be assumed that the period of time from the moment when the preliminary decision for RYAN is taken, up to the order to deliver the strike will be of very short duration, possibly 7-10 days. It

is however impossible that preparation for a nuclear attack should not be reflected in the pattern of work of the country's state institutions which are involved in safeguarding the defence capability and security. During this period attention must be paid especially to discovering indirect indications of preparation, which we think would be as follows:

- Unusual activity at the Prime Minister's residence at 10 Downing Street, where there will be energetic consultations without informing the press about who was at the meetings and what was discussed:

- Changes in the system of operation of the Ministry of Defence. Work may be carried on in the evenings and at night and also on non-working days. Obviously cars will be observed in large numbers at the administrative offices of the Ministry of Defence in London:

Main building, Whitehall, SW1;

Old War Office building, Whitehall, SW1;

Empress State Building, Lillie Road, SW6;

Old Admiralty Building, Spring Gardens, SW1;

Lansdowne House, Berkeley Square, W1;

Metropole Building, Northumberland Avenue, WC2;

Adastral House, Theobolds Road, WC1;

1-15 St Giles Street, WC2;

CAA House, 45/49 Kingsway, WC2;

Castlewood House, 77-91 New Oxford Street, WC1;

First Avenue House, High Holborn, WC1;

The Adelphi, John Adam Street, WC2;

Leysdown Road, SE9.

- Cancelling leave of MOD, intelligence, counter-intelligence, and police personnel and also service units;
- Appearance on the streets of military detachments and armed details of police in greater numbers than usual;
- Announcements of a military alert in units and at bases; military exercises;
- Activity on the air. Appearance of new channels of communications. Some existing channels may be cleared for use in future for military purposes;
- Restrictions imposed by the authorities on movement round the country of members of foreign embassies in Britain, in the first instance those of the USSR and socialist countries.